Technology

Post-Quantum
Architecture.

SPHINCS+-SHAKE-256f-simple · Kyber-1024/ML-KEM-1024 · Winterfell STARK proofs. 19 Rust crates. Security Level 5 on every cryptographically sensitive path. No classical fallback. No trusted setup. No exceptions.

FIPS 205 · SLH-DSA FIPS 203 · ML-KEM Winterfell STARK Security Level 5
Cryptographic Primitives

The Post-Quantum
Boundary.

FIPS 205 · SLH-DSA
SPHINCS+
Security: One-wayness of SHAKE-256 (hash-based)

Stateless hash-based signature scheme. Used for transaction signing, block signing, and P2P message authentication. Shor's algorithm provides zero advantage against hash preimage hardness.

Variant
SHAKE-256f-simple
Security Level
Level 5 (≥256-bit PQ)
Public Key
32 bytes
Signature Size
7,856 bytes
FIPS 203 · ML-KEM
Kyber-1024
Security: Hardness of Module-LWE (lattice-based)

Lattice-based key encapsulation mechanism. Used for validator binding, peer KEM channel establishment, and wallet key management. No known quantum speedup against MLWE.

Variant
ML-KEM-1024
Security Level
Level 5 (≥256-bit PQ)
Public Key
1,568 bytes
Ciphertext
1,568 bytes
Winterfell · STARK
STARK Proofs
Security: Collision resistance of BLAKE3 (hash-based, FRI)

Transparent, post-quantum zero-knowledge proofs requiring no trusted setup. Used for block validity proofs and cross-chain bridge verification. 48-column execution trace over f128 field.

Proof Gen (avg)
~850 ms
Verification (avg)
~12 ms
Trusted Setup
None required
Trace Columns
48
Post-Quantum Boundary

Every Path. Every Operation.

All operations within the boundary are post-quantum secure. No classical public-key primitive or pairing-based construction is present on any cryptographically sensitive path.

✍️
Transaction SigningSPHINCS+-SHAKE-256f-simple on every submitted transaction
📦
Block SigningSPHINCS+ block signature required alongside STARK proof
📡
P2P AuthenticationSPHINCS+-signed messages; unauthenticated messages dropped
🔑
Key EncapsulationKyber-1024 for all validator binding and peer channels
🔍
Block Validity ProofsWinterfell STARK — transparent, no trusted setup
⛓
Bridge ProofsSPHINCS+-bound STARK proof transcripts for cross-chain
🌳
State CommitmentsSHA3-256 Sparse Merkle Trie — 256 levels, 8,192-byte proofs
🔒
Key Lifecyclezeroize::Zeroizing<> wraps all secret keys; zeroed on drop
Security Audit

Independent Review.
0 Critical Open.

2
Critical · All Resolved
3
High · All Resolved
0
Critical Findings Open
14
Total Findings
Severity Count Resolved Acknowledged Notes
Critical220All resolved
High330All resolved
Medium431SA-M4: EIP-1559 design property; documented in THREAT_MODEL.md
Low330All resolved
Informational211SA-I2: NTP drift guard — mainnet gate
Total14122Cleared for mainnet preparation
Adversarial Test Suite

72-Hour Test Run.
All Scenarios Passed.

All ten adversarial scenarios verified on the 7-validator testnet configuration. STARKProofTamper and LoadStress STARK timing added at Protocol Version 5.

ValidatorCrash(1)
f=1 < 2.33; consensus resumed immediately on remaining 6 validators
✓ PASS
ValidatorCrash(2)
f=2 < 2.33; consensus resumed on 5 validators; BFT safety maintained
✓ PASS
NetworkPartition(4/3)
Majority partition continued; minority halted safely; healed cleanly on reconnect
✓ PASS
LongRangeReorg(10)
Rejected at FinalityManager (invariant I-CON3); finalised blocks immutable
✓ PASS
LongRangeReorg(50)
Rejected at FinalityManager (invariant I-CON3); 50-block reorg attempt blocked
✓ PASS
DoubleSign(validator-0)
33% of stake slashed; evidence committed to audit log; validator tombstoned
✓ PASS
TxReplay
Rejected by nonce check before mempool entry (invariant I-S5)
✓ PASS
InvalidBlockFlood(1,000)
All 1,000 rejected at SPHINCS+ gate before deserialization; peer rate-limited
✓ PASS
STARKProofTamper
Tampered proof rejected at BlockValidityVerifier; proposer penalised
✓ PASS
LoadStress(10,000 TPS, 60s)
Block capacity saturated; STARK proofs generated within 3,000 ms slot budget throughout
✓ PASS
Codebase

19 Rust Crates.
Acyclic Graph.

Each crate has a single defined responsibility. The inter-crate dependency graph is acyclic, enforced at build time. A vulnerability in networking cannot directly access private key material.

bleep-crypto
SPHINCS+, Kyber-1024, AES-GCM, SHA3
bleep-zkp
Winterfell STARK prover + verifier
bleep-consensus
PoS BFT, slashing, epoch mgmt
bleep-state
Sparse Merkle Trie, RocksDB
bleep-vm
7-engine execution router
bleep-p2p
Kademlia DHT, onion routing
bleep-rpc
46 JSON-RPC endpoints, warp
bleep-auth
Credentials, JWT, RBAC, audit log
bleep-scheduler
Epoch tasks, block timing
bleep-indexer
BLAKE3 content-addressing
bleep-pat
Programmable Asset Token registry
bleep-ai
AIConstraintValidator, DeterministicInference
bleep-governance
LiveGovernanceEngine, ZKVotingEngine
bleep-bridge
4-tier BLEEP Connect
bleep-wallet-core
Key lifecycle, zeroize
bleep-tokenomics
MAX_SUPPLY, emission, fee split
bleep-node
16-step startup sequence
bleep-genesis
Genesis block, vesting contracts
bleep-testnet
7-validator adversarial suite